Since China started market reform and opened to the outside world in 1978, Chinese society has gone through quick industrialization, urbanization and economic development. In less than 40 years, China has nished the transition from one of the poorest countries to the second largest economic entity in the world (Barboza 2010). e dramatic and tremendous social changes, together with the state s family planning policy, pushed the Chinese family into transition as well.
tools, the government encouraged couples to have fewer children (shao 少) at a relatively later age (wan 晚), and with a longer birth interval (xi 稀) (Liang 2009).
However, the relatively exible birth control policy was proved not to be very e ective. As Chinese population reached more than 800 million in 1970 and almost 1000 million around 1980, the policy was tightened up.
One-child policy was issued in 1980. It regulated that, in principle, each urban couple can only have one child. However, the number of children that rural couples can have varied by provinces, ranged from one (in most coast provinces) to two children, including socalled 1.5 child (1) (Attané 2002) . Although Chinese government relaxed the family planning policy in 2015
by allowing two children for each couple, there is no doubt that family planning policy in recent 30 years has directly changed the patterns of Chinese families (Wang Y. 2006 ).
e other essential social forces behind the transition of Chinese family include, but are not limited to, industrialization and urbanization. China has thousands of years of history as an agriculture society, and its social tradition, including family structure and inter-generational relationship etc., was developed based on agriculture production (Fei 1992) . However, economic reform and opening to foreign investment accelerated industrialization and urbanization, leading to changes in family structures and living arrangements. Table 1 shows that in 1952, three years a er the establishment of People s Republic of China, agriculture sector accounted for about 51% of total national GDP.
e proportion of agricultural sector signi cantly dropped to about 28% in the year of the reform in 1978, and to less than 9% a er almost 40 years of the reform in 2015.
Another even stronger in uence of industrialization in recent 30 years is the change of employment structures. Under the socialist planned economy, the Chinese government preferred capital-intensive heavy industry to labor-intensive light industry, and ignored developing the tertiary industry. (2) In 1978, while the proportion of non-agricultural industries increased to about 72% of total value of national GDP, non-agricultural workers only accounted for less than 30% of total employment (Table 2) . Industrialization before the reform did not provide comparable amount of employment opportunities. In fact, there were still more than 家族社会学研究 第 29 巻第 2 号 2017. 10 70% of laborers working in agriculture. However, employment structure quickly changed a er the reform.
Nowadays almost 72% of Chinese laborers work in non-agriculture sectors, more than twice as high as the percentage of agricultural laborers (28%). China is no longer a society of peasants.
As industrialization changed the occupation structures and converted many peasants into non-agricultural workers, urbanization along with industrialization moved these former peasants into cities, and transformed some of their residential villages to urban neighborhood. In 2015, there were about 277 million rural residents worked at non-agricultural jobs; about 169 million of them had jobs out of their hometown, and mostly in large or medium-sized cities (SSB 2016).
Starting from 2011, the total number of people living in cities outnumbered those in villages ( 
In sum, the transition of Chinese family can be observed from many perspectives; for example the transformation of family structure (Wang Y. 2006 (Wang Y. , 2013 Yang and He 2014; Peng and Hu 2015) , the changes of marriage matching patterns (Xu 2000; Li Y. 2008 Li Y. , 2011 Qi and Niu 2012) , the variations of rst marriage and divorce (Wei et al. 2013; Yu and Xie 2013; Xu et al. 2015) , housework division (Yang 2014; Liu et al. 2015; Tong and Liu 2015; Yu 2014) and inter-generational co-residence (Wang and Li 2007; Shen et al. 2012; Chen and Chen 2016; Song and Huang 2011) . In this article, we will explore the change of the Chinese family from three perspectives: the changes in family structures, the current challenge in elderly support and women s role inside family, in order to understand the evolution of the core family value re ected by the strong-ties between generations (Huang 2011), during the process of modernization. e main change in family structure (Table 4) is nei- Source: Data of 1953 Data of , 1964 Data of , 1982 Data of , 1990 Data of , 2000 Data of , and 2010 came from census. Data of other years came from 1% Population Sampling Survey (http://www.stats.gov.cn/). Another survey on elderly aged 60 and over showed that in Beijing (Table 6) Although the change of residential patterns shows that fewer elderly people live with children, it does not mean that the role of children in elder caring is weakened. Table 7 shows that, family is still the most impor- In contrast, rural families, relative to urban areas, maintain being more traditional. Rural sons still played the most important role in caregiving (Table 7) . About 69% of the rural elderly were cared by sons family However, it might be worth more attention to explore how women adjust their double roles as both daughters and daughters-in-law in caregiving. As parents have fewer children (or even have just one child), daughters are taking more responsibility in taking care of their own parents. Whether they will quit their traditional role of taking care of parents-in-law is not very clear. But we found some clue in urban China which shows more urban parents depend on daughters instead of daughters-in-law for eldercare.
II. Changes in Family Structures
In addition, there is research showing that, the elderly whose main caregivers are daughters (including sons-in-law) are more satis ed with the care they obtained than the elderly whose main caregivers are sons (including daughters-in-law). Although rural parents might obtain more economic support from sons than daughters, they are more likely to obtain higher-quality of emotional support and daily care from daughters/ sons-in-law than from sons/daughters-in-law (Zeng 2007 ).
Another di erence between urban elderly and rural elderly in caregiving patterns is that urban elderly are more likely to depend on caregivers outside the family. Daughters status is also improved for rural families.
Under the family planning policy, most of rural families can have at most two children. It means, rural daughters in general have fewer competitors for family resource than before. As family has more resource (for economic development) and fewer children, rural daughter also gained unprecedented opportunity to develop for their future (Zhang 2005 ).
e improved status of daughters can be proved by their educational attainment (Table 8) . Another even stronger evidence is re ected by the enrollment of higher education (Table 9) . From 1990
to 2015, the percentage of female students in higher education quickly caught up. Currently there are more female students than male students studying in three- Our review shows that, under the e ects of modernization, people in China do become more independent as the proportions of single-person and couples-only families increased substantially. However, the proportion of stem-family maintains stable without increasing or decreasing, showing that the traditional family pattern in China was able to be at least maintained.
Second, although the size of Chinese families become smaller and nuclear families would transit to might still need longer time to determine whether Chinese families will be able to maintain its tradition in the future, and which part of the uniqueness will remain, stem-family as family structure, intergenerational ties, family care for elderly people, or son preference.
Notes
(1) It means couples are allowed to have the second child if the rst is a girl.
(2) Phillips et al. 2002; Wang et al. 2014 ). (12) e percentage of nuclear families dropped more than 10% from 2000 to 2010 (Table 4) . 
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